Logical reasoning PrepTest 151 · Section 4 · Question 23

Incorrect. The conclusion is one term of a conditional premise, so it's not a restatement.

Correct. Argument or Facts:
Argument

Valid or Flawed:
Flawed

Question Type:
Errors in Reasoning

Stimulus Summary:
Legislation a result of negotiation → No one is happy with it
No one is happy with the current legislation
Therefore, it must be the result of negotiation

Answer Anticipation:
As with most Errors in Reasoning questions with conditional logic, this argument messes that feature of the logic up. After establishing the conditional rule, it concludes the sufficient condition based on the presence of the necessary condition. It does get tricky, reaching the conclusion before establishing the premise (thus the order in the argument itself matches the conditional, even though the logic is reversed), but we should still be looking for an answer that states it confuses a necessary condition for a sufficient one.

Answer Explanation:
You should stick with this answer choice as soon as you see it's talking conditional logic. Here, instead of using the phrase "sufficient condition," it uses an equivalent—"the condition leads to" a result. But what is a sufficient condition? A condition that guarantees—i.e., leads to—that result. Here, this answer describes the error in the argument—it concludes that a certain condition (compromise) is necessary for a result (unhappiness) merely from the claim that the condition (again, compromise) leads to that result (unhappiness).

Key Takeaway:
Your default assumption should be that an Errors in Reasoning question that features conditional logic is messing that logic up. Start there, and only consider other flaws if you're convinced the conditional logic isn't erroneous.

Incorrect. The key terms in the conclusion are "agreement," "compromises," and "interest groups," none of which appear to have any different meaning in the conclusion compared to the premise.

Incorrect. The argument is about a specific piece of legislation, so it doesn't assume something as broad as "no" legislation can "ever" satisfy "all" groups. Additionally, the argument only brings up legislation that's made as a result of compromise—it doesn't treat it as if all legislation must go through this process.

Incorrect. This answer can be tempting since the sufficient condition in the general principle isn't met in the premises about this particular case. However, there's a difference between not establishing a sufficient condition and having a "different kind of case"—the case in question is still legislation that could have been the result of compromise. Without a specific note that this legislation is of a different type, this answer doesn't necessarily apply.