PrepTest 133

[lcid:3631] Prep Test 133 LSAT — Reading Comp — S4 Reading comp

Passage

Questions 1-7  .        In Alaska, tradition is a powerful legal concept,  . appearing in a wide variety of legal Remaining source text redacted.
Passage walkthrough
Passage Summary

Topic: Legal Studies


Paragraph 1

  • Paragraph note
    • Legal concept (tradition as an exemption) and resulting problems (not defined, so problematic/inconsistent rulings)
  • Views, minor Meta-Structures, and the author's attitude
    • Comparison, according to the author:
      • Both state and federal laws allow individuals to engage in "traditional" activities in Alaska that would otherwise be off limits (second sentence)
    • Cause-and-effect relationship, according to the author:
      • "Traditional" is rarely defined, which causes legal rulings to be problematic and inconsistent (third through last sentences)
    • Author's attitude: "powerful" (first sentence); "rarely defined" (third sentence); "seems to be a presumption" (fourth sentence); "Failure" (last sentence); "has given rise to problematic and inconsistent legal results" (last sentence)

Paragraph 2

  • Paragraph note
    • Introduction to a concept associated with tradition (long-standing practice) and two court cases that illustrate problems with concept
  • Views, minor Meta-Structures, and the author's attitude
    • Definition of "long-standing practice": Passage of time as well as continuity (first sentence)
    • Examples of problems associated with the "long-standing practice" concept, according to the author:
      • Two cases about sea otter pelts (last sentence)
    • Author's attitude: "most prevalent" (first sentence); "illustrate the problems" (last sentence)

Paragraph 3

  • Paragraph note
    • Background on cases (1972 exemption for "traditional native handicrafts" but not sea otter pelts)
  • Views, minor Meta-Structures, and the author's attitude
    • Comparison, according to the author:
      • The 1910 Fur Seal Treaty prohibited hunting sea otters and the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) also prohibited hunting sea otters but made exemptions for "traditional native handicrafts," but not items made with sea otter fur since they weren't used "within living memory" (first to last sentences)

Paragraph 4

  • Paragraph note
    • Two cases are discussed (changed "living memory" standard since Alaska Natives couldn't make pelts for reasons outside their control)
  • Views, minor Meta-Structures, and the author's attitude
    • Examples of cases that illustrate problems with definitions of "traditional," according to the author:
      • Case 1: Marina Katelnikoff articles seized; court rules this was fine (first and second sentences)
      • Case 2: Boyd Dickinson (and MK) articles seized; court rules that this wasn't OK since "living memory" wasn't a good definition of traditional, as the tradition was broken "by forces beyond" Native Alaskan control (third through last sentences)
    • The court's view (in the second case):
      • The "living memory" standard is too strict because Native Alaskans couldn't practice tradition due to Russian occupation/U.S. law (fifth through last sentences)

Main Point: Two cases involving sea otter pelts illustrate how the failure to define "tradition" has resulted in different interpretations, sometimes leading to problematic and inconsistent legal results.

Meta-Structure?

Generalization/Example: This passage most closely fits the Generalization/Example Meta-Structure.* In such a passage, the author usually makes a sweeping generalization, typically near the beginning of the passage. The remainder of the passage describes one or more specific examples that illustrate the sweeping generalization.

The author follows that pattern here, using the first paragraph to argue that the failure to define "tradition" in written laws has led to "problematic and inconsistent legal results" (P1, S5). The rest of the passage describes two cases that "illustrate the problems" associated with a common understanding of "tradition" as a legal concept (P2, S2).

In a Generalization/Example passage, the main point is generally the author’s sweeping generalization. Often, the main point will be presented as a variation of, "[The specific example] illustrates [sweeping generalization]." So, we made the main point: "Two cases involving sea otter pelts illustrate how the failure to define "tradition" has resulted in different interpretations, sometimes leading to problematic and inconsistent legal results."

*That said, you could argue this is a Problem/Solution passage (problem: the definition of "traditional" as a long-standing practice that's been continuous "within living memory"; solution: change "within living memory" standard). You could even argue that this is an Old Approach/New Approach passage (old approach: the definition of "traditional" as a long-standing practice that's been continuous "within living memory"; new approach: doesn't have to be continuous practice). Even though we though this passage is most explicitly presented as a Generalization/Example, you could develop an understanding of the main point and the passage's structure with these other Meta-Structures.

Last Thoughts?

Paragraph 3 was something we definitely glossed over, but there will likely be questions that ask us to distinguish between the Fur Seal Treaty of 1910 and the MMPA of 1972, as well as not getting the FWS confused in there. Let’s be sure to head back to that paragraph to check any details when they’re being asked about.

Question prompt

The passage most strongly Remaining source text redacted.
Why the credited answer is right

Credited answer: B

The notes below walk through why it fits the stem and how to eliminate the rest.

Question Type

Legal

Strategy Overview

Refer to notes or what you highlighted/underline to locate where the passage discusses the court in the 1986 case, and refer to the relevant part of the passage as needed to find that answer choice that must be true

Answer Anticipation

For questions that ask us to infer, from a few details in the passage, an answer choice that must be true, quickly finding and reviewing those details is critical. That is why we make brief notes describing the role of each paragraph and highlight or underline definitions and the minor Meta-Structures — doing so helps us find the salient information efficiently and reliably. Once we review that part of the passage, we can look through the answer choices to see which one is best supported by what we reviewed. Since the question stem asks us to make an inference, the correct answer probably won't restate something from the passage. Instead, the question will likely require us to draw a connection between a few different pieces of information.Here, the question asks how the court in the 1986 case thought "traditional" should be defined. Where did the passage discuss the 1986 court's rationale? According to our notes, the fourth paragraph discusses both cases, so we should check there. And doing so shows us that the 1986 case was the one where the FWS's regulations were upheld by the district court (P4, S1). What were those regulations?According to our notes, the FWS's regulations are outlined in the third paragraph. There, "traditional" crafts were defined as those commonly produced before 1972 and "within living memory" (P3, S3-S4). So, the court in the 1986 case may have been content that "traditional" should refer to goods or activities from before 1972 that continue to be produced or practiced "within living memory."We also have to remember the context of the passage as a whole. The author's main point that the two cases were meant to highlight the problematic and inconsistent court rulings from "the application of this sense of 'traditional'" (P2, S2). What sense was that? It involved viewing "long-standing" as referring both to "the passage of time" and "continuity and regularity of use" (P2, S1). This lines up with the regulations requiring the craft to have been made "within living memory" suggesting a continuity/regularity of use.So, the 1986 court, in ruling that sea otter furs weren't a part of traditional crafts, must have determined that the FWS was correct to rely on the continuity/regularity of use sense of "traditional." Let's find an answer reflecting that.

Answer choices

  1. A
    reflects a compromise between Remaining source text redacted.
    Why choice A is not credited

    (A) Does this say that the 1986 court believed that "traditional" meant that the goods or activities must have been continually or regularly produced or practiced?

    Nope. As we reviewed, the court sided with the FWS, (P4, S1), and nothing else is said about their ruling, so there's no hint of a compromise.

  2. B
    emphasizes the continuity and Remaining source text redacted.
    Why choice B matches the stem

    (B) Does this say that the 1986 court believed that "traditional" meant that the goods or activities must have been continually or regularly produced or practiced?

    Yes! The FWS regulations upheld by the court in 1986 said that a "traditional" practice must have been used "within living memory" (P3, S3-S4). This referred back to the aspect of the definition of "tradition" that was stated as being problematic/inconsistently applied in two court cases (P2, S2). The problem came from how to interpret "long-standing," with one definition requiring a "continuity and regularity of practice" that was reflected in the "within living memory" aspect of the FWS regulations (P2, S1). So, the court, in upholding the FWS regulations, was relying on "long-standing" as referring to a continuity of use that would require a practice to have been done within living memory. This answer is, therefore, correct. Since it matches our anticipation, we can justifiably select it and advance straight to the next question.

  3. C
    reflects the term's usage Remaining source text redacted.
    Why choice C is not credited

    (C) Does this say that the 1986 court believed that "traditional" meant that the goods or activities must have been continually or regularly produced or practiced?

    Nope. We can eliminate (C). In fact, it was the second court case that argued the FWS regulation "defie[d] common sense" (P4, S8), which is close enough to everyday discourse. And that court reached a different decision on the same fact pattern as the 1986 case (P4, S4). So it wasn't the 1986 case that had the court rely on everyday discourse, but rather the 1991 case.

  4. D
    encourages the term's application Remaining source text redacted.
    Why choice D is not credited

    (D) Does this say that the 1986 court believed that "traditional" meant that the goods or activities must have been continually or regularly produced or practiced?

    No. So, we can cross off (D). Besides, this answer choice is factually inaccurate. The FWS regulations upheld by the court in the 1986 case had two parts. First, the crafts needed to be commonly produced before 1972 (P3, S3). Second, they had to have been produced within living memory (P3, S4). If anything, these regulations encourage the application of "traditional" to neither recently developed nor all age-old activities (if the latter had an interruption in practice).

  5. E
    reflects the concerns of Remaining source text redacted.
    Why choice E is not credited

    (E) Does this say that the 1986 court believed that "traditional" meant that the goods or activities must have been continually or regularly produced or practiced?

    Nope. The court upheld the FWS regulations over the objection of a Native Alaskan (P4, S1), so it did the opposite of this.

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